

Forced Modernization and Public Policy: A Case Study of Ayub Khan Era (1958-69)

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Abstract

The decade of 1960s in Pakistan witnessed modernization under General Ayub Khan, who passionately believed in the progressive-liberal and modernist version of Islam. His broad-mindedness and liberalism towards Islam was explicitly manifested in the official Islamic policy pursued during the first half of his regime from 1958 to 1965 when he governed the country in an authoritarian manner. During these years, the modernization program was implemented through public policies aimed at bringing about a progressive change in the constitutional, legal and social spheres of the country. It was, however, forced as well as highly selective and authoritarian in nature. The military regime pushed its modernization agenda despite opposition and resentment from many sections of the society. Nonetheless, the second half of the regime 1965-69, which was 'quasi-authoritarian in nature', saw a reversal of his official policy towards Islam, since his popularity was undermined, and he needed popular support for his regime. The present article explores the modernization measures undertaken during the regime of Ayub Khan, and analyzes the shift in the official Islamic policy in the country.

Key-words: Forced modernization, public policy, General Ayub Khan, modernist Islam, opposition

Modernization has affected a number of societies all across the globe. In many instances, modernization processes initiated by the states in many countries have been quite rapid and forced. Among the Muslim countries, Egypt, Turkey, and Iran, and to some extent, Pakistan are conspicuous examples of forced modernization by undemocratic and repressive regimes. In Egypt, Muhammad Ali Pasha (1805-48) initiated a program of forced modernization in the first half of the nineteenth century. In the decade of 1920s, Turkey underwent modernization

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under Mustafa Kamal Atatürk (1881-1938). In the decade of 1930s, Iran witnessed modernization under Emperor Mohammad Reza Shah (1919-1980) (Kamali, 2006). In the decade of 1960s, Pakistan undertook the path of modernization under General Ayub Khan. All these instances of modernization were highly selective and authoritarian in nature. In case of most of these countries, modernization projects were launched by non-democratic governments, since such governments do not need popular support for their public policies. Therefore, modernization programs were forced despite opposition and resentment from many sections of the society.

In many countries, military is considered to be the most modern and Westernized state institution. A number of studies have treated the subject of army as a tool of modernization in many traditional and/or developing countries all around the world, particularly when army enters political arena. (Bienen, 2008). Pakistan is not an exception in this regard. Pakistan's army is also considered to be a modern and West-oriented institution, and it has also seized power in the country quite a number of times. With the exception of the government of General Zia-ul-Haq (r. 1977-88), which witnessed a program of forced Islamization in the country, other military regimes such as those of General Ayub Khan and General Pervez Musharraf have embarked on the course of forced modernization.

The speeches and statements of General Muhammad Ayub Khan (d. 1974) manifest his liberal and progressive approach towards the matters of religion. He is said to be a modernist Muslim. In other words, he personally believed in the modernist version of Islam, said to have been propagated and symbolized in South Asia by Nawab Abdul Latif of Calcutta, Sir Syed Ahmad Khan, Syed Ameer Ali and Allama Muhammad Iqbal. During his regime, Ayub Khan tried to modernize various spheres of the Pakistani polity through public policies. The modernization he envisioned for the country was to be achieved not only through constitutional and legal means, but through social reforms as well.

Ayub Khan's regime can be divided into two distinct phases: the first phase beginning from 1958 to 1965, which can further be sub-divided into two periods. From 1958 to 1962, Ayub Khan governed the country as the Chief Martial Law Administrator and then from 1962 to 1965 as President after the withdrawal of Martial Law in 1962. The first phase of Ayub Khan's regime was characterized by authoritarian pattern of governance aided by the Martial Law authorities. In this phase, Ayub Khan tried to introduce the modernist version of Islam through public policies. His efforts to modernize the Pakistani society led him to introduce some constitutional, legal and social changes in the country.

The traditionalists, led by the *ulama* (religious scholars), vehemently resisted the modernization agenda of the government.

The second post-elections phase of his regime, i.e. from 1965 to 1969, represents democratic form of government, though dubbed as 'controlled democracy'. It saw a reversal in the public policies aimed at modernization, as the modernization agenda was abandoned by the regime. A host of factors were responsible for this reversal. By and large, it was owing to the pressure of various forces, predominantly the religious leaders, who posed a threat to the legitimacy of Ayub Khan's regime that led the government to reverse its policy.

The present study is significant owing to the fact that Ayub Khan's era, being the first military regime in the country, appears to be distinct in terms of the state policies. It offers an interesting study as one may compare and contrast two diametrically opposed patterns of governance in the same regime headed by the same head of the state. The present paper is an attempt to analyze the features of the public policy aimed at modernization of the Pakistani polity during the Ayub Khan regime. While doing so, it also tries to explore the factors that were responsible for the said shift in the public policy in the second phase of the regime.

The present study attempts to address the following questions: What was the personal religious orientation of Ayub Khan? What steps were taken by him to modernise the society implying 'change' in public policy under him? What was the reaction of the religious leaders to the state attempts at modernization? Why and how did the changes occurring in the political system of the country render pursuance of the hitherto chalked out line of action impossible? And what were those perceivable threats to the regime, which led to the abandonment of the modernization agenda?

1. Islam, Modernism and Public Policy in Pre-1958 Era: An Overview

Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the founding father of Pakistan, was a modernist and against theocracy. Similarly, Liaquat Ali Khan was also not in favour of Pakistan becoming a theocratic state (Munir, 1980). The ideas of the first two statesmen also reflected the viewpoints of the majority of Muslim League leadership consisting of modern western educated elite. Owing to their westernized orientation and lack of any background of traditional Islamic learning, the questions of religion did not significantly figure out for them. They generally did not perceive any problem of compatibility between traditionalism and modernism

regarding the practical matters of religion. However, the traditionalist *ulama* came to play very major role in politics after independence in 1947 because of their mass appeal. *Jamiat-i-Ulama-i-Islam* (JUI), founded in January 1948, was led by Maulana Shabbir Ahmed Usmani while *Jama'at-i-Islami* (JI), established in 1941, was headed by its founder-leader Maulana Abul Ala Maududi. Both JUI and JI along with other traditionalist *ulama* soon began demanding the introduction of an Islamic system in the country. To them, the notion of Western parliamentary democracy was totally incompatible with the spirit of Islam (Rosenthal, 1965). JUI demanded creation of the office of *Shaikh al-Islam* and Ministry of Religious Affairs, and appointment of a committee of *ulama* to draw Islamic Constitution for the country.

The modernists, on the contrary, maintain that the *ulama* were practically ignorant of the complex procedures involved in constitution-making. The antagonism between the modernist and the traditionalists in the first decade after independence was manifested by three factors/events: the adoption of the Objectives Resolution in 1949, the anti-Ahmadi agitation in 1953, and the constitutional debates before the framing of 1956 Constitution of Pakistan. In this regard, in 1949, a Board of Talimat-i Islamiya consisting of *ulama* was appointed, with the aim to advice on matters, which may arise out of the Objectives Resolution. The Board's recommendations were, however, rejected as being impractical (Binder, 1963), though its impact on constitution-making was clearly visible on the subsequent Constitutions of 1956, 1962 and 1973.

The pre-1958 coup era represents the ideological interplay of Islam and political modernism. The traditionalist *ulama* and modern politicians debated from their respective stands but the focus of their controversy remained within the parameters of politics. The public policy did not focus on the social and cultural aspects of Islam and its compatibility or the otherwise with the contemporary modern times.

2. Ayub Khan's Personal Orientation and Vision about Islam

Ayub Khan was personally believed to be a practicing Muslim, and it is supported by the works and words of many of his close friends and associates. Writing about his own religious background, Ayub Khan writes in his autobiography *Friends Not Masters* that his father wanted him to have grounding in Islam and Muslim thought (Khan 1960). Col. Mohammad Ahmad in his book *My Chief* portrays the personal life of Ayub Khan and his interest in the matters of religion. The author has narrated a few incidents reflecting his regularity in observing the fasts and other religious occupations during the holy month of *Ramazan* like

studying the biography of the Holy Prophet (peace be upon him) and translation of the Holy Quran, etc.(Ahmaed, 1960).

Nonetheless, one must not forget that Ayub Khan was educated at Aligarh, and later at Sandhurst Military Academy in the UK. His pastimes—shooting grouse on the demesnes of Scottish lords, the golf course, and whisky in the evening—reflected an Anglicized lifestyle and social values. An analyst aptly observes that in Ayub Khan, Macaulay stood vindicated, Sir Sayyed triumphant (Ahmed, 1982). Ayub Khan passionately believed in the progressive-liberal and modernist version of Islam. In the words of Dr. Fazlur Rahman, in the view of Ayub Khan, Islam that did not lead to progress was 'Obscurantist Islam' (Rahman, 1985). Ayub Khan himself throws light on his progressive views: "We were fortunate to have a religion which could serve as a vehicle of progress. But superstition and ritualism had given us a fatalistic outlook which was completely contrary to the teachings and message of Islam". (Khan, 1960) Then he writes in the preface of his autobiography that schism between the *ulama* and the modern educated classes can be overcome by a proper interpretation of Islamic principles and their application to the present-day problems (Khan, 1960). At another place, he writes that Pakistan was not achieved to create a priest-ridden society but it was created to evolve a liberal and enlightened society (Khan, 1960). In an address at a *madrasah* (a religious seminary) he stated:

This I consider a great disservice to Islam, that such a noble religion should be represented as inimical to progress....In fact, it is great injustice to both life and religion to impose on twentieth century man the condition that he must go back several centuries in order to prove his bonafides as a true Muslim (Khan 1960).

Ayub Khan's approach to Islam, in the opinion of Anita M. Weiss, which was consistent with that of the majority of Pakistanis, was characterized by non-participation in activities repugnant to Islam. (Weiss, 1987). Moreover, religion seemed to him to be the sole basis of national unity. He knew that Islam was the only unifying factor between East and West Pakistan. In a nutshell, Ayub Khan wanted to introduce and implement modern reformist interpretation of Islam in the country. He believed in a synthesis of modernist and traditionalist interpretations of Islam in order to make it compatible with the changing modes of time.

3. Forced Modernization through Public Policies under Ayub Khan

Ayub Khan's broad-mindedness and liberalism towards Islam was explicitly manifested in the official Islamic policy pursued during the first half of his regime from 1958 to 1965 when he governed the country in an authoritarian manner. The second half of the regime 1965-69, which was 'quasi-authoritarian in nature' (Shafqat, 1989), nonetheless, saw a reversal of his official policy towards Islam.

Dr. Fazlur Rahman classifies the history of Pakistan into four distinct periods, each symbolizing some marked changes in governmental attitudes and policies towards an Islamic polity. The first phase of Ayub Khan's regime, in his view, saw a major change in official Islamic policy in Pakistan. The decade exhibited a growing sense of religious modernism at official and public levels. "In a basic sense", the author continues, "there was an important development as the era [sic] pushed the confuse and ambiguous attitudes of the earlier official Modernists towards a crisp clarity making out Islamic Modernism clearly from the fundamentalist conservative i.e., traditionalist stand" (Rahman, 1985). The statement is partly true because initial years of the decade did manifest a marked change in the official Islamic policy. In the words of Saeed Shafqat, Ayub Khan "strived to orientate the political system along liberal secular lines, and at the same time made an effort to institutionalize the role of Islam in the political system of Pakistan. He symbolized the predicament of the Modernists in Pakistan" (Shafqat, 19...). But the method he adopted for introducing the changes was coercive and non-participatory. His military background and professional ethos emphasized discipline, order and authoritarian values rather than political participation and consensus-building through dialogue and accommodation (Rizvi, 2003). However, after 1965 when democratic processes were formally set in the country, the pursuance of the policy was discontinued owing to the reaction from different sections of the society.

The following steps were taken in the initial years of Ayub Khan's regime aimed at bringing about a progressive change in the country in the constitutional, legal and social spheres:

3.1 Constitutional Changes

Ayub Khan was critical of the role of religion in politics. Therefore, he tried to de-emphasize the role of Islam in politics in the Constitution of 1962. The Law Commission, appointed before the promulgation of Martial Law with the aim of facilitating the task of Islamization of existing laws of the country, was replaced by Law Reform Commission

(Afzal, 1991). It is also important to note that Ayub Khan in his address before the Karachi High Court Bar Association in January 1959 made no mention of Islamic provisions in the new Constitution. Only by the end of the year he declared that the new Constitution would reflect Islamic principles (Feldman, 1967). In fact, it was only after the strong criticism from some religious circles that he began to use expressions like 'Islamic values' and 'Islamic ideology'. Despite that, the recommendation of the Constitution Commission to incorporate the Islamic Provisions of the 1956 Constitution was out-rightly ignored.

First, the Objectives Resolution, which was incorporated in the 1956 Constitution as its Preamble, was modified. The phrase that "Sovereignty over the entire universe belongs to Allah" was retained but in its second part, i.e. "...the authority to be exercised by the people of Pakistan within the limits prescribed by Him (Allah) is a sacred trust", the words "within the limits prescribed by Him" were omitted. However, later through the first Constitutional Amendment in 1963, the words were reincorporated in the Constitution (The Constitution of Pakistan, 1964).

Secondly, in the Principles of Policy it was stated that the Muslims of Pakistan should be enabled to order their lives in accordance with the teachings and requirements of *Islam*. In the previous Constitution of 1956, instead of "Islam", the phrase stated "Quran and Sunnah". Dr. Fazlur Rahman suggests that it was strongly suspected that this substitution of the word Islam was made on the advice of a religious group called *Ahl al-Quran*. The group puts exclusive reliance on the Quran as the sole determinant of Islamic doctrine and practice, and at the same time repudiates Hadith while questioning its authenticity. The contemporary representative of this group was Ghulam Ahmad Pervaiz (1903-1985) who had a number of followers among modern educated elite (Rahman, 1985).

Thirdly, in the Constitution of 1956, the country was to be known as the "Islamic Republic of Pakistan". But in October 1958, President Iskander Mirza changed the official name of the country to just "Pakistan" by a Presidential Order (Feldman, 1967). The change in the official name of the country was retained in the 1962 Constitution. However, later in December 1963, Pakistan again became an "Islamic Republic" after amending the Constitution owing to the pressure by the religious groups. (The Constitution of Pakistan, 1962; Weekes, 1964).

Fourthly, to please the religious sections of the country, Ayub Khan partly retained the basic Islamic Provisions of the Constitution of 1956 in the new Constitution, though only in a diluted form. The repugnancy

clause of the earlier Constitution stated that no law shall be passed which will be repugnant to the teachings and requirements of Islam as set out in the Holy Quran and Sunnah, and that existing laws should be brought into conformity with the Quran and Sunnah. However, in the 1962 Constitution, the repugnancy clause in article 8 merely included the phrase that “no law should be repugnant to Islam” (The Constitution of Pakistan, 1962). The legislature was to decide the Islamicity of any legislation. It vividly laid down that the validity of any law would not be questioned on the ground that it was not in accordance with the ‘Principles of Law-making’. The new Constitution included no provision to bring existing laws into conformity with the Quran and Sunnah (Choudhry, 1969). Dr. Fazlur Rahman had feared that the clause would lead to controversy over religious issues in the country, and thus suggested that the task of interpretation of Islam should be left to the Supreme Court (Shah 1996). One of the inconsistencies in the Constitution included a note of explanation following the repugnancy clause, which stated: “...in application of this principle to the personal law of any Muslim sect, the expression ‘Quran and Sunnah’ shall mean the Quran and Sunnah as interpreted by each sect.” (The Constitution of Pakistan, 1962). This provision opened the door for as many interpretations of Quran and Sunnah as possible.

Fifthly, article 199 of the Constitution envisaged a ‘novel’ Islamic Provision providing for Advisory Council of Islamic Ideology. It was to be appointed by the President on his discretion. However, he was to give due consideration to the members’ understanding of Islam when appointing them. The said Council was to make recommendations to the Central and Provincial governments to enable the Muslims of Pakistan to order their lives in accordance with the principles and concepts of Islam. Moreover, it was to advise the National and provincial assemblies, the President or a Government or on any question referred to it for advice. However, the advice of the Council was not binding on the legislature or the President or the Governor (The Constitution of Pakistan, 1962 and Choudhry, 1969). When Ayub Khan selected its members in July 1962, the selection reflected a broad-based character of the Council. Ayub Khan did not allow conservative and traditionalist *ulama* to become its members, and ensured that besides lawyers and administrators only “relatively emancipated” *ulama* become its members. However, the issue of the membership of the Council resented the *ulama* in general, who felt marginalized (Shafqat, 1989). The members of Advisory Council of Islamic Ideology included a lawyer, Justice S. A. M. Akram as Chairman, a former Columbia University Professor and Vice Chancellor of Karachi University, I. H. Qureshi, and Maulana Abul Hashim, Director of the Islamic Academy of Dacca (Weekes, n.d).

Sixthly, in 1959, the government established Central Institute of Islamic Research, which was aimed at reformation of Islam through research. This Institute was later renamed Islamic Research Institute (IRI) in 1965. In fact, the Advisory Council of Islamic Ideology was to be supported by IRI. As a matter of fact, article 197 of the 1956 Constitution had provided for an Islamic Research Institute, but it was no more than a paper institution. However, Ayub Khan retained the article in the 1962 Constitution, and granted the Institute enhanced financial aid and facilities. Its function was to 'define Islam in terms of its fundamentals in rational and liberal manner in order to bring out its dynamic character in the context of the intellectual and scientific progress of the modern world' (Ahmed, 1963). Dr. Fazlur Rahman was appointed Director of the Institute by Ayub Khan. He was an exponent of modernist Islam. He was considered the primary source of innovative ideas and policies of Ayub Khan's regime. For this reason, he became the main target of criticism from the *ulama*. A conflict arose on the publication of a controversial book of Dr. Fazlur Rahman titled *Islam*. Although he wrote it earlier in 1958 at McGill University, Canada while studying Islam, it was published in 1966 from Chicago. His pronouncement on Family Law Ordinance, and interest, etc. had already brought him a bad name. The book was mentioned in May 1968 in the National Assembly, and then it was followed by a number of letters and resolutions. The *ulama* agitated against it. The Ayub Government initially remained unmoved, but in May-August 1968, the agitation became uncontrollable. Dr. Fazl, the then Director of the Islamic Research Institute, was eventually forced to resign in September 1968 (Zafar, 1968). Certain religious quarters claimed the resignation as the success of Islam (Zafar, 1970). Ayub Khan was forced by the pressure of country-wide successful strikes and anti-government agitation undermining the legitimacy of his rule. Therefore, Dr. Fazl was asked to resign.

Lastly, the Constitution of 1962 also enfranchised women. So the women candidates enthusiastically contested Basic Democracies Elections in town constituencies in large numbers. (Williams, 1962). In addition to women suffrage and their right to contest elections for the open seats, six seats were reserved for women in the National Assembly and five seats in the provincial legislatures according to article 20 of the Constitution (The Constitution of Pakistan, 1962).

The Constitution of 1962 did not have an Islamic appearance. All the clauses related to Islam were included in its non-justiciable part (Afzal, 19....). Religious circles of the country raised much hue and cry against the handling of Islam and Constitution by Ayub Khan. The most vehement and most effective criticism came from JI headed by

Maulana Abul Ala Maududi. The party was later banned and its leader was put behind bars. He had considerable appeal among West Pakistanis. Another religious group was rallied under the banner of *Nizam-i-Islam* Party under the leadership of Maulana Athar Ali. It was more moderate group than JI. Former Prime Minister Choudhri Mohammad Ali had joined it and became its important leader. In the National Assembly, Islamic Democratic Front exerted considerable influence on decision-making. It was headed by Maulana Abdul Bari. Other extreme religious groups were *Khaksars* and the *Ahrars* who also criticized the policies of the government (Weekes, n.d).

3.2 Introduction of New Laws

Ayub Khan also wanted to effect social change and bring modernism through legislation. It can be well assessed from the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961. In fact, in 1954, a Commission on Marriage and Family Law was appointed which presented its report in June 1956. The recommendations of the Commission were, however, implemented in March 1961 during the regime of Ayub Khan (Khan, 1960). The recommendations of the Commission could not be implemented earlier after the submission of the report owing to the controversy it had generated. It was Ayub Khan who took the bold step of introducing some reforms at social level recommended by the Commission. The Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 provided that marriages and divorces be registered; permission be sought from the court for second and subsequent marriage(s); divorce be effective only after it had been approved by the court; minimum age for marriage be fixed at 14 for female and sixteen for male; and a grandson of a pre-deceased son be allowed to inherit property of his grandfather. The Ordinance is regarded as 'the first step toward modernization of family life' (Jr.,1975) and "the most progressive interpretation of Muslims family law to be implemented in the subcontinent" (Rosenbloom, 1995).

In addition to the Ordinance, the Child Marriage Restraint Act and Dissolution of Muslim Marriage Act were also enacted in 1961. It was only after outmaneuvering the *ulama* that Ayub Khan had got passed the bill from the National Assembly. These Acts and Ordinance discouraged polygamy, protected the rights of wives and granted the rights of inheritance to grand children (Wriggins, 1975).

In 1959, the Ayub Government promulgated West Pakistan Auqaf Properties Ordinance, 1959, and established Ministry of Auqaf for the supervision and management of religious endowments including shrines and tombs of Sufi Shaykhs. This measure was aimed at

containing the power of the *mullahs* and *pirs*, especially in rural areas of the country.

3.3 Social Reforms

Ayub Khan's government also aimed at reforming some social institutions. Some of the key areas of social reform reflecting his liberalism were as such:

The Ayub government set up an Ulema Academy in Lahore. It was an attempt by the government to modernize the *ulama* and religious leadership in the country. Moreover, religious leaders associated with the Academy were handpicked by the government, who could extend help to and support the regime in the hour of need.

Population planning program began in Pakistan in the early fifties. Under Ayub Khan, it was expanded into full-fledged ministry (Syed, 1985). To check the inordinate growth of population in 1965 in the Third Five Year Plan, a sum of Rs. 284 million was allocated for family planning. It was one of the most ambitious family planning programs in the developing world. Ayub Khan's personal interest gave an added impetus to the drive. In addition to Family Planning Boards at provincial and district levels, a network of paid family planning officers was also established. An extensive well-directed propaganda was also carried out (Williams, 1975). Family Planning Commission was established and Enver Adil was appointed as its head. Ayub Khan also established a National Research Institute of Family Planning as well.

Ayub Khan appointed General Burki as the Minister for Health, Social Welfare and Labour who gave a new impetus to the social welfare sector. Women organizations like All Pakistan Women Association (APWA) felt being 'helped, consulted, utilized and encouraged' (Williams, 1975). The long-term program of national reconstruction also aimed at the improvement of the status of women in Pakistani society.

4. Forced Modernization under Ayub Khan: A Reappraisal

It has been stated that Ayub Khan stands out as 'the first Muslim ruler in South Asia who tried to put his country on the modern secular path without renouncing the fundamental principles of Islam' (Guahar, 1993). Ayub Khan wanted his countrymen to see and realize the changing modes of time and then re-orient themselves in the light of new demands and challenges. For this very reason, he insisted on a new liberal reinterpretation of Islam to suit the contemporary times.

With good intentions in his mind, he tried to introduce some progressive constitutional, social and legal reforms in the country. Nonetheless, it was a kind of forced modernization, as he knew that his countrymen were not ready to accept these innovations. Therefore, he suppressed the opposition to the modernization, and skillfully maneuvered the passage of the new laws in the National Assembly in 1963.

According to Christophe Jaffrelot, Ayub Khan pursued the 'modernization of Islam', although from traditional Islam, he extracted a political model, that of the Caliph Umar (634-44), who governed single-handedly, and from time to time sought advice from a consultative committee (Jaffrelot, 2002). The *ulama*, who were the custodians of religious traditionalism, were forced into background. The activities of JI were, for instance, curtailed, and the JI leader, Maulana Maudodi, survived an attempt on his life during a party meeting in 1963, and was imprisoned twice in 1964 and 1967 (Nasr, 2006).

The religious sections of the society severely resisted the modernization agenda. Religious leaders saw the reforms of Ayub Khan as a direct challenge to the traditional role of the *ulama* as the guardians of Islam and advisers to Muslim governments. The *ulama* resisted the displacement of their traditional role and authority as well as their more conservative religious worldview (Eposito, 1987). In particular, the Muslim Family Laws repelled the religiously oriented sections of the Pakistani society, who resented their exclusion in the state legal system, which only co-opted them (Gozlowski, n.d.).

The modernists did appreciate the progressive changes but they resented the use of religious symbolism in order to claim the legitimacy from the masses. Not only the modern reformist interpretation of Islam was preached in the country but also the slogan of Islamization was used to grab more powers in the name of Islam. The government-supported religious leaders were used for political mobilization of the masses. They became the spokesmen of the government on different policies. Although it cast a dark shadow on the role of the religious leaders yet the ordinary masses remained critical of the government policies.

Lawrence Ziring writes that the country's first need was political stability, which was to be followed by economic progress and social change. Real political stability means popular satisfaction and a general acceptance of the governmental process. But in Pakistan, political unity was being undermined by controversies and conflicts. The struggle between modernizers and traditionalists had further complicated the situation (Ziring, 1971). Therefore, Ayub Khan using

his expediency thought to abandon the policy in the best interest of his regime. Probably he had not foreseen the strength and reaction of the masses before practically undertaking the task of modernization of the country. He had under-estimated the force of public opinion and over-estimated the strength of coercion in his authoritarian pattern of governance.

During the first phase of his regime when Ayub Khan ruled the country in a dictatorial manner, he did not need popular legitimacy, which was partly extended by the armed forces. His 'constituency' was a handful of men of high ranks of Pakistan Army. But after 1965 elections when the democratic process was initiated, Ayub Khan wanted to acquire popular support and consequently, legitimacy for his regime. Since the essence of democracy is 'bargaining', he was not in a position to overlook or altogether disregard the public opinion. He had have to accommodate mass demands. Therefore, in the second phase of his regime, he abandoned his efforts to modernize various spheres of the polity.

In order to perpetuate his political power, he followed a policy of appeasement whereby the demands of the religious leaders and *ulama* were partially accommodated, if not fulfilled absolutely. To appease the religious sections of society for widening his popular legitimacy, which was being undermined by their continuous anti-government propaganda, his policy underwent a reversal. Laws were amended or repealed in face of potential threats to his regime.

In the presidential elections of 1965, Ayub Khan needed the support of the *ulama*. Ayub Khan's position was challenged by Miss Fatima Jinnah—the revered sister of the founder of the country, who was a presidential candidate. However, he persuaded some *ulama* to issue a *fatwa* (a legal verdict) against the candidature of Miss Jinnah, that according to Islamic law, a woman cannot contest for presidency, or be a head of the state (Nasr, 1996). By doing so, Ayub Khan had "raised the regime-legitimizing role of the Traditionalists and also facilitated the Islamization of politics" (Shafqat, 1989). Later, these *ulama* played a crucial role in the anti-Ayub movement during 1968-69, which eventually culminated in the fall of the government in 1969.

To conclude with some theoretical inferences, it can be asserted that power has its own dynamics although in some instances, it varies. Political power may be exerted in a host of manners and forms, and in multiple dimensions. Every political order or pattern of governance has its own processes, requirements, and limitations. In an authoritarian pattern of governance, mass demands can be overlooked by exerting

'pressure from above'. A government may initiate and implement public policies in a coercive manner. On the contrary, in case of democratic authority pattern in a polity, 'pressure from below' considerably shapes the decision-making processes. Hence, the mass demands are accommodated through a give-and-take policy by a democratically elected government. In some cases, democracy, which often goes hand in hand with political modernization, may not seem suitable for social and religious modernization, and thus military governments are generally in a better position to initiate and implement modernization agenda than democratically elected governments.

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